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Abstract
When considering a new vaccine program or modifying an existing one, economic
cost-benefit analysis, underpinned by predictive epidemiological modelling, is a key
component. This analysis is intimately linked to the willingness to pay for additional
QALYs (quality-adjusted life-years) gained; currently in England and Wales a health
program is economically viable if the cost per QALY gained is less than £20,000,
and models are often used to assess if a vaccine program is likely to fall below this
threshold cost. Before a program begins, infection levels are generally high and
therefore vaccination may be expected to have substantial effects and therefore will
often be economically viable. However, once a program is established, and infection
rates are lower, it might be expected that a re-evaluation of the program (using current
incidence information) will show it to be less cost-effective. This is the scenario we
examine here with analytical tools and simple ODE models. Surprisingly we show
that in most cases the benefits from maintaining an existing vaccination program are
at least equal to those of starting the program initially, and in the majority of scenarios
the differences between the two are minimal. In practical terms, this is an extremely
helpful finding, allowing us to assert that the action of immunising individuals does
not de-value the vaccination program.
Introduction
Mathematical modelling has become an important tool in the study of infectious dis-
eases and their control. Models have been used for both scenario planning (Ander-
son and May, 1983; McLean and Anderson, 1988; Ferguson et al., 2003) and real-time
challenges (Baguelin et al., 2010), and enable policy makers to gain predictions associ-
ated with different courses of action. By far the most developed area of epidemiologi-
cal modelling comes from the cost-effectiveness evaluations associated with vaccination
(Williams et al., 1996; Trotter and Edmunds, 2002; Melegaro and Edmunds, 2004; Jit
et al., 2008; Baguelin et al., 2010; van Hoek et al., 2011). Such model-based input is seen
as vital in ensuring that health resources budgets are used most effectively.
In England and Wales, advice on vaccination programmes is provided by the JCVI
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(Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation) as an an independent Departmental
Expert Committee and a statutory body. JCVI has strict criteria which determine if a vac-
cination programme can be recommended (JCVI, 2013): in addition to the vaccine being
safe and effective, it must also be cost-effective. This is determined as a trade-off between
vaccine costs and health benefits. Health benefits are measured in quality adjusted life
years or QALYs (Mehrez, 1989); to be deemed cost-effective in England and Wales there
needs to be at least 1 QALY gained for each £20,000 spent (where savings in medical
costs can be offset against the costs of the vaccine and its administration). This relation-
ship between health benefits and costs can then be translated into a threshold price (will-
ingness to pay) for the vaccine, below which the vaccine will be considered cost-effective.
In practise this is a difficult calculation, where the QALY loss due to infection and the
associated medical costs need to be calculated based on available health data and health-
risks within the population (Richardson and Manca, 2004). However, in the context of
this paper it is sufficient for us to assume that QALYs will be directly proportional to
cases, and that the threshold willingness to pay will be proportional to the QALYs gained
per vaccine delivered. Our two fundamental measures are therefore the amount of vac-
cine deployed and the total reduction in cases due to vaccination. In this way we remove
much of the medical heterogeneity and instead concentrate on the relationship between
vaccination and reduction in cases.
One fundamental aspect of health-economic theory is the concept of discounting –
that future costs and benefits are worth less than current ones. This can either be viewed
as providing some account of future uncertainties (it is difficult to estimate the impact of
infection in 50-years times) or can be related to inflation and alternative ways of investing
the health budget. In the UK a discounting rate of δ =3.5% per year is generally applied;
this has the mathematical and conceptual advantage that all long-term integrals are finite,
and accounts for the natural inclination that it is better to save one life now than one life in
the future (all other things being equal). Therefore, when we talk about total future costs
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and benefits, this discounting is naturally applied:
Total Costs =
∫ ∞
0
Costs(t) e−δt dt Total Benefits =
∫ ∞
0
Benefits(t) e−δt dt
Throughout this work we make a number of simplifying assumptions about the in-
fection biology which allow us to analytically predict the impact of vaccination with a
range of models. We generally assume SIR (susceptible-infectious-recovered) dynamics
with life-long immunity, thus ignoring the delays caused by a non-infectious latent (or
exposed) class (Anderson and May, 1992; Keeling and Rohani, 2008). We also assume
a homogeneous population where the risk of infection is independent of risk of disease,
such that we can assume that the health costs are directly proportional to the number of
infected cases. Finally, we make the simplifying assumption that individuals are vacci-
nated at birth and that the vaccine provides 100% protection for life; although other levels
of protection could be readily included although this would introduce an extra scaling
factor. In the following section we build-up from simple ODE models, where some an-
alytical traction is possible, to more complex age-structured models which have greater
realism.
Methods
We begin by defining the simple SIR (Susceptible - Infectious - Recovered) ODE model,
and consider the equilibrium points and their stability with and without vaccination. The
basic ODE model with vaccination is given by:
dS
dt
= B(1 − v) − βS I − dS
dI
dt
= βS I − γI − dI (1)
dR
dt
= γI − dR
dV
dt
= Bv − dV
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where we assume that S , I, R and V are the proportions of the population that are sus-
ceptible, infectious, recovered and successfully vaccinated and immunised respectively
(Anderson and May, 1979; May and Anderson, 1979; Anderson and May, 1992; Keeling
and Rohani, 2008). Other parameters are: B the population-level birth rate, d the natural
death rate, β the transmission rate of the pathogen from infectious to susceptible indi-
viduals, γ the recovery rate and v is the proportion of new-borns that are protected by
vaccination. In what follows, we make the simplifying assumption of constant population
size (B = d, S + I + R + V = 1), and because we are assuming that both infection and
vaccination confer complete life-long immunity, it is appropriate to amalgamate the R and
V classes and simply concentrate on the 2-dimensional system given by S and I.
For this model, the basic reproductive ratio R0 is a crucial parameter (Anderson and
May, 1979; May and Anderson, 1979; Anderson and May, 1992; Keeling and Rohani,
2008): when R0 > 1 the infection can invade and spread in the absence of vaccination;
whereas when R0 < 1 any invasion is doomed to deterministic failure. For this simple, the
basic reproductive ratio is defined as:
R0 =
β
γ + d
(2)
Throughout we will make the obvious assumption that we are only concerned with con-
trolling infectious diseases with R0 > 1.
One equilibrium point of the system of SIR equations is the disease-free state (S ∗ =
(1−v), I∗ = 0), which is only stable if v > 1−(γ+d)/β. This threshold (vc = 1−(γ+d)/β =
1 − 1/R0) defines the point at which the amount of on-going vaccination is sufficient to
eradicate the infection. The alternative endemic fixed point (which is stable if v < vc) is
given by:
S ∗ =
1
R0
=
γ + d
β
I∗ =
d(1 − v)
γ + d
−
d
β
=
d
β
((1 − v)R0 − 1) (3)
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For clarity in what follows we use I∗0 and I
∗
v to refer to the endemic level of infection with
and without vaccination.
We next consider the stability of the endemic equilibria (I∗v ); this is given by the Jaco-
bian at the fixed point:
J =

−βI∗v − d −βS
∗
v
βI∗v βS
∗
v − γ − d
 =

−(1 − v)R0d −(γ + d)
((1 − v)R0 − 1)d 0

Hence the eigenvalues Λ obey:
Λ2 + Λ(1 − v)R0d + (γ + d)((1 − v)R0 − 1)d = 0
and the solutions are:
Λv = −
(1 − v)R0d
2
±
√
(1 − v)2R2
0
d2 − 4(γ + d)((1 − v)R0 − 1)d
2
(4)
Making the standard assumption that the birth and death rates are low compared to other
parameters (B = d ≪ 1) (Anderson and May, 1979; May and Anderson, 1979) and that
the vaccination rate is significantly below the critical level for eradication (v < vc), the
eigenvector is complex and hence the dynamics close to equilibrium are damped oscilla-
tory cycles (Figure 1).
Another interesting case to be considered is the limit when v approaches the critical
value for eradication vc; in this limit I
∗
v → 0 and Λv → −d and 0. In this limit the dy-
namics are no-longer oscillatory and the fixed point is neutrally stable. Finally these two
regions (where the approach to the fixed point is oscillatory and non-oscillatory) are sep-
arated by the point vmax which is when the square-root in equation (4) is zero.
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Economic Costs and Benefits
As stated above, the decision about where a vaccination programme is cost-effective is
made by balancing the health benefits against the financial costs of vaccination. The
health benefits of a vaccine program is measured as the reduction in the number of QALYs
lost over time with a discounting factor (δ) applied. This discounting factor (generally set
at 3.5% per year in England) ensures that the long-term costs and benefits remain finite,
and account for the natural inclination that it is better to save one life now than one life
in 50 years time (all other things being equal). For a simple homogeneous model the
discounted QALY loss from infection is directly proportional to the discounted number
of cases, which itself is proportion to the discounted proportion of infected individuals in
the population, over all time. We therefore consider two important quantifies Iv(t|S
0, I0)
and I0(t|S
0, I0): the dynamics of infection with and without vaccination starting at the
initial condition S (0) = S 0, I(0) = I0. The main quantity of interest, the change in
discounted QALYs over time with and without vaccination, is then proportional to the
discounted change in cases with and without vaccination:
∆QALY ∝ Zv(S
0, I0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt I0(t|S
0, I0)dt −
∫ ∞
0
e−δt Iv(t|S
0, I0)dt
Figure 1a and 1b demonstrates this effect graphically: showing the dynamics of beginning
at either the vaccinated or unvaccinated equilibrium, and the associated discounted saving
(or gain) of cases. Here Figure 1a shows a prospective analysis of the number of cases
averted at the cost of introducing vaccination, while Figure 1b shows a contemporary
analysis of the number of additional cases caused by the cost-saving measure of stopping
a successful vaccination programme. In this extreme example we have taken a high birth-
rate, a low reprodu tive ratio and a high recovery rate to highlight the oscillatory infection
dynamics.
The cost of any vaccination scheme, is a mixture of four factors integrated over all
time: the total discounted cost of the vaccine; the total discounted cost of administering
the vaccine; and any costs associated with adverse reactions to the vaccine (which should
7
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be minimal); and any cost savings due to a lower number of cases and therefore less
medical treatment. The first three of these are proportional to the amount of vaccine
administered (v), while the latter is proportional to the change in cases Zv. Therefore, all
relevant quantities (such as costs per QALY gained, or threshold prices for the vaccine)
are formulated in terms of simple relationship between v and Zv.
Simple Analytics, below eradication threshold
Using the above formulae (equations 1, 3 and 4) with the assumption that the dynamics
close to endemic equilibrium are oscillatory both with and without vaccination (that is,
v is significantly below both vmax and vc), we can calculate the expected benefit of any
vaccination program. In particular, if we consider the eigenvalues to be of the form:
Λv = −Av ± iωv
then the infection dynamics can be approximated as:
Iv(t|S
0, I0) ≈ I∗v + (I
0
− I∗v ) exp(−Avt) cos(ωv[t + θ])
Here we can take θ = 0, if we make the simplifying assumption that the dynamics begin
from an equilibrium (steady-state) level of infection either with or without vaccination.
In which case, we can drop the dependence on S 0 and our quantity of interest (which is
proportional to the change in discounted QALYs due to a vaccination program) is approx-
imated by:
Zv(I
0) ≈
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
I∗0 + (I
0 − I∗0) exp(−A0t) cos(ω0t)
]
dt
−
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
I∗v + (I
0 − I∗v ) exp(−Avt) cos(ωvt)
]
dt
≈ I∗0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
1 − exp(−A0t) cos(ω0t)
]
dt − I∗v
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
1 − exp(−Avt) cos(ωvt)
]
dt
+ I0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
exp(−A0t) cos(ω0t) − exp(−Avt) cos(ωvt)
]
dt (5)
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We are now in a position to return to our original question: what is the impact of
evaluating vaccination programs at different initial levels of infection? In particular we
are interested in:
∆Zv = Zv(I
∗
0) − Zv(I
∗
v )
the difference between evaluating a vaccination program before it has begun compared to
once it has reached vaccinated equilibrium. From equation (5) it is clear that the depen-
dency on the initial starting level of infection (I0) can be readily separated:
∆Zv =
[
I∗0 − I
∗
v
] ∫ ∞
0
e−δt
[
exp(−A0t) cos(ω0t) − exp(−Avt) cos(ωvt)
]
dt
=
[
I∗0 − I
∗
v
] ( A0 + δ
(A0 + δ)
2 + ω20
−
Av + δ
(Av + δ)
2 + ω20
)
(6)
Using the equilibrium values calculated in equation 3 and the real and imaginary eigen-
values calculated in equation 4, the first order terms in ∆Zv can be found assuming that
both d and δ are small compared to other terms:
∆Zv =
(d + δ)v2R20
2[(1 − v)R0 − 1][R0 − 1]γ
2
+ O(d2, δ2) (7)
which we expect to be relatively small (as both d and δ are small, and the level of vacci-
nation is well above the erradication threshold v > 1 − 1/R0).
We now wish to contrast ∆Zv with Zv(I
∗
0
), that is the value calculated before the vacci-
nation program begins, again assuming d and δ are small:
Zv(I
∗
0) =
vd
γδ
−
d(1 − v)R0 + 2δ
2[(1 − v)R0 − 1]γ
2
+ O(d2, δ2) (8)
Comparing the approximations for ∆Zv and Zv(I
∗
0) from equations 7 and 8, and assuming
that the birth and death rate and also the discounting rate are small and of the same or-
der, we find that ∆Zv is expected to be small whereas Zv(I
∗
0
) is of order one. Hence, for
much of parameter space, the differences due to the initial starting level of infection are
minimal compared to the magnitude of Zv itself, and such differences only arise through
differences in the eigenvalues at the vaccinated and unvaccinated equilibria.
9
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An alternative quantity to examine is the relative difference between the expected
benefits of vaccination if it is calculated beginning at the vaccinated equilibrium compared
to being calculated from the non-vaccinated equilibrium.
Z(I∗v )
Z(I∗0)
= 1 +
vδ(d + 2δ)R0
[(1 − v)R0 − 1][R0 − 1]γd
+ O(d2, δ2) (9)
Some what surprisingly, and against initial intuition, we find that Z(I∗v ) > Z(I
∗
0
); that is
the benefits of continuing vaccination are greater than the benefits of starting vaccination
– assuming that we are above the eradication threshold.
Simple Analytics, at eradication threshold
It is clear that many of the above formula break down as we approach the critical vaccina-
tion threshold (that is (1 − v)R0 → 1). We therefore explicitly consider this limit, noting
that the dynamics about I∗v = 0 are no-longer oscillatory. In this case, we find:
∆Zv =
d(R0 − 1)
(d + δ)γR0
+ O(d, δ) (10)
Z(I∗0) =
d2(R0 − 1)
δ(d + δ)γR0
+ O(d, δ) (11)
Z(I∗v )
Z(I∗0)
= 1 +
δ
d
+ O(d, δ) (12)
Suggesting similar qualitative behaviour with Z(I∗v ) > Z(I
∗
0
).
Numerical Results
While the analytic approximations (equations: 7 - 12) provide the insight that the impact
of the initial conditions is likely to be small, only through numerical evaluation of either
these approximations, or through numerical integration of the underlying ODEs, can we
gain a full appreciation of the likely behaviour. Figure 2a shows the behaviour of Zv(I
∗
v )
against Zv(I
∗
0
) as the vaccination rate v changes, calculated from equation () using analytic
10
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forms for the integrals. As expected from equation (9), for the majority of vaccine uptake
levels (v) there is relatively little difference between the two values of Zv; it is only as
we approach v = vmax when the eigenvalues becomes real, that large discrepancies appear
– in particular Zv(I
∗
0
) first sharply decreases as v → vmax before increasing slightly for
vmax < v < vc. However, for values of v up to 95% of the eradication threshold (marked
by black crosses), there is relatively little difference between the two values, although
with Z(I∗0) < Z(I
∗
v ) as predicted by equation (9).
The obvious next-step is to numerically integrate the SIR ODEs (equation (1)) to
understanding the role of assumptions needed to gain analytical traction: in particular,
the implications of assuming that the dynamics are locally sinusoidal. Here we impose
S (0) = 1/R0, which matches our theoretical assumption that the dynamics are at the vac-
cinated or unvaccinated equilibria. Again we consider a range of vaccination levels up to
the eradication threshold, with the greatest concentration of points near this threshold. For
the true ODE dynamics, we find that the behaviour is much simplified. Throughout the
entire range of vaccination rates, the two measures of vaccination benefit Z(I∗0) and Z(I
∗
v )
calculated from the ODE solutions are in very close agreement, although as predicted by
our theory Z(I∗0) < Z(I
∗
v ). For the three sets of (typical) epidemiological parameters used
in figure 2, we find remarkably close agreement between the ODE results (Figure 2b) and
the numerical evaluation of our approximations (Figure 2a) for all levels of vaccination
up to 95% of the eradication threshold.
We take this numerical assessment one stage further, by performing a sweep of param-
eter space. We therefore examine a wide region of parameter space for the two epidemi-
ological parameters (β and γ, ensuring 1 < R0 < 10) and vary the level of vaccination v
although ensuring it is above the critical threshold. We again compare Zv(I
∗
0) with Zv(I
∗
v )
but do this through the percentage change between vaccinated and unvaccinated equilib-
ria, captured by parameter Pv:
Pv = 100 ×
Zv(I
∗
v ) − Zv(I
∗
0)
Zv(I
∗
0)
(13)
11
Page 12 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
which is also equal to the percentage change in the health benefit (discounted QALYs
gained) calculated from the two equilibria. Figure 3 shows that this percentage change, is
generally small and positive (as expected from the above theoretical calculations, equa-
tion (7)), and can be related to the dominant eigenvalue at the vaccinated equilibrium Λv.
In particular, when both the real and imaginary parts ofΛv are small (which happens when
v ≈ vc) , the percentage change attains its highest value.
Finally, we return to the motivating question: comparing the benefit of vaccination
before a campaign has begun and after it has been implemented for some finite time,
T ; relaxing the assumption that the calculations start from an equilibrium. We therefore
modify the percentage change formulation and consider Qv,T , the percentage change in
the health benefit between starting at the non-vaccination equilibrium and starting once
the vaccination scheme has been in operation for time T. Figure 4 shows these results for
three different models. The top graph re-displays the results from Figure 3, noting that
Pv = Qv,∞. The centre graph uses the same ODE formulation (equation (1), but consid-
ers finite time, T , between 1 and 10 years. Finally the lower graph uses an age-structured
model (Schenzle, 1984) (see Supplementary Material for full formulation), and so is com-
parable to the types of model often used to address applied policy questions in the health
economics of vaccination. In all three examples Qv,T is generally small and positive; for
example using the simple ODE (figur 4b) model 95% of the values of Qv,T lie between
−0.05% and 0.2%. For the age-structured model (figure 4c) the percentile range increases
(95% of the values lie between −12% and 11%) which we attribute primarily to the de-
lay between vaccination at birth and the peak of epidemiological transmission in school
children. We also note that for this age-structured model, the majority of the declines in
health benefit (negative values of Qv,T ) occur for low levels of vaccination and hence low
levels of Zv(I
∗
0), suggesting that these are of limited practical relevance.
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Discussion
Using models of differing complexity – from analytical approximations to age-structured
ODES – we have addressed the critical question of how a cots-benefit analysis of vac-
cination might be influenced by when this calculation in undertaken. Usually economic
analyses are conducted prior to the start of a vaccination program to evaluate its value for
money; however as new information becomes available it may be necessary to re-evaluate
the program. There are two ways in which this can be done: a retrospective analysis that
calculates costs and benefits from the start of the program, but includes the new informa-
tion; or simply a contemporary analysis from the current point in time going forwards.
Essentially it is these two different analyses that are compared here. We note that in some
cases a the generation of new (finer resolution data) may mean that only a contemporary
analysis is possible. There is understandable concern that a contemporary (rather than ret-
rospective) re-evaluation could be biased by the lower levels of infection that arise from
the presence of a vaccination program. This would mean that programs which were cost-
effective at pre-vaccination disease prevalences might lose this cost-effectiveness over
time, leading to a unstable situation where doing the most cost-effective action might lead
to alternating patterns of vaccination and non-vaccination. In contrast, our analyses show
the reassuring picture that the cost-benefit analysis is relatively unchanged due to an ex-
isting vaccination scheme; if anything there is a slightly greater benefit for retaining an
existing scheme than starting a new one. In practical terms this means that once a decision
to begin vaccination has been made, we do not enter a cycle of switching the program off
and on as the levels of infection vary – rather the potential for future cases means that
vaccination must be maintained. This finding is surprisingly robust to different epidemi-
ological parameters, demographic rates, vaccine up-take and the economic discounting
rate.
As with any modelling study there are elements of reality that are not captured. Mutli-
ple important factors should be considered before this is applied to any practical problem.
Firstly, this analysis only informs about a single vaccination program, it does not provide
any information when there are two programs targeting different risk or age groups. For
13
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example, suppose we consider vaccination of two risk groups: A and B; then whether or
not group A has been part of an existing program will influence the cost-effectiveness of
vaccinating group B. To place this in practical and current terms, the proposed vaccina-
tion of boys against HPV (Human Papilloma Virus) (Tam and Sturgis, 2016) is strongly
influenced by the existing program in girls (Datta et al., 2017).
Secondly, the models used are deterministic and only work well away from the critical
vaccination threshold, vc. As the population nears herd-immunity when the infection may
go locally extinct, re-introduction of the pathogen plays a major role as does the poten-
tial extra costs of a large sudden outbreak. The 2013 outbreak of measles in Swansea
illustrates this point (Moore et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 2015), the ensuing epidemic that
followed the stochastic introduction of measles into the local population had a devastat-
ing public-health impact, justifying the need for continuedmeasles vaccination even when
cases are low.
As shown in Figure 4c, the natural delays introduced by age-structure can influence the
accuracy of the analysis, especially if there are long delays between the age of vaccination
and the peak of transmission. Again, vaccination against HPV provides a prime example:
vaccination is usually targeted at 12-year-old girls whereas the peak of transmission is
generally in those aged around 20 – this lag means that even if vaccination is stopped,
cases continue to decline for several year (Datta et al., 2017) which has a significant im-
pact on the calculated cost-effectiveness.
Throughout we have implicitly assumed that the vaccine confers complete immunity
throughout the programme. In ractice no vaccine offers complete protection and there-
fore our vaccination level v should be considered as the proportion of new-borns that are
successfully immunised generating life-long immunity. Of greater concern is the issue of
vaccine escape (Pe´rez-Sautu et al., 2011) or strain replacement (Shiri et al., 2017), where
the effectiveness of the vaccine may wane over time due to evolutionary adaptation, either
in terms of the emergence of new strains or the increase in existing strains not covered
by the vaccine. In such cases, the benefits of continuing a vaccination campaign may
diminish through time, often prompting new broader range vaccines to be introduced.
The modelling and analytical results within this paper are all based upon the endemic
equilibria and stability for SIR-type dynamics. The results from the age-structured model
14
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(Figure 4c) indicate that the general results are also likely to hold for other more complex
infection dynamics (such as SEIR) where there is lifelong immunity. Questions regard-
ing SIS-type dynamics and waning immunity both from infection-derived and vaccine-
derived immunity require more complex models, which may need to include differential
rates of waning immunity and the implementation of booster vaccines. The analysis of
this more complex scenario is beyond the scope of this paper and likely requires bespoke
modelling matched to the situation under investigation.
A more complex situation where our analysis does provide an understanding is when there
is an initially high cost at the beginning of the campaign; this lowers the cost-effectiveness
of starting vaccination and hence increases the relative cost-effectiveness of maintaining
vaccination once the programme is underway. This high initial difference could be be-
cause of the costs surrounding the start-up of a new program. Alternatively, many new
programmes are associated with catch-up campaigns (which aim to rapidly increase herd
immunity) but are less cost-effective than vaccination at birth.
Finally, in any practical situation, a bespoke model is generally needed to capture all the
details of the epidemiology (e.g. (Trotter and Edmunds, 2002; Melegaro and Edmunds,
2004)) such as age-dependent susceptibility and costs (due to differential health impacts
and risk factors of adverse effects) or the need for multiple booster vaccines to maintain
immunity. Hence, while these results strongly suggest that health-economic findings are
likely to be independent of current vaccination levels, full mechanistic models, carefully
matched to available data, are needed to inform policy decisions.
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Figure 1: Schematic examples of (a) the discounted savings accrued over time starting at
the unvaccinated equilibrium and introducing vaccination at time zero (b) the discounted
costs accrued over time starting at the vaccinated equilibrium and stopping vaccination
at time zero. In both figures oscillatory dynamics are observed, but these are more pro-
nounced in graph b. (Parameters are B = d = 0.122 per year, R0 = 2, γ = 10 per day,
δ = 3.5% per year.)
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Figure 2: The difference in the discounted benefits of vaccination; plotting the benefit of
introducing vaccination to an unvaccinated population (x-axis) and the benefit of retaining
vaccination for a population that is at its vaccinated equilibrium (y-axis). (a) Theoretical
results from equations 9 and 12; (b) Numerical results from solving the ODEs over the
same parameter ranges. The point at which 95% of the critical vaccination level (0.95vc)
is marked with a cross, and points between vmax and vc are darker coloured. For the
numerical results (b) it is clear that the theoretical behaviour close to vc does not occur, and
the benefit of vaccination is relatively independent of the initial condition. (Parameters
are B = d = 0.0122 per year, δ = 3.5% per year.)
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Figure 3: Relative percentage difference in the benefit of vaccination depending of the ini-
tial condition (vertical axis), against the real and imaginary components of the eigenvalue
at the vaccinated equilibrium. From this graph it is clear that the eigenvalue is the ma-
jor determining factor, and that the benefits for remaining at the vaccinated equilibrium
are consistently greater than the benefits of starting vaccination from the unvaccinated
equilibrium. (Parameters are B = d = 0.0122 per year, δ = 3.5% per year, γ ∈ (0, 1),
R0 ∈ (1, 10), v ∈ (0, vc).)
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Figure 4: Relative percentage difference in the benefit of vaccination depending of the
initial condition (y-axis), against the benefit of vaccination starting at the initial conditions
(x-axis). Graph (a) compares vaccinated and unvaccinated equilibria of a simple SIR
model (as in Figure 3); graph (b) compares the unvaccinated equilibria with the state
arrived at if vaccination campaign has been operating for a time T , for a simple SIR
model; graph (c) is the equivalent of graph (b) for an age-structured SEIR model, using
POLYMOD mixing matrix. For models (a) and (b) there is relatively limited effect of
initial conditions, such that the 95% of the simulations are between 0 and 1.3% for (a)
and between −0.05% and 0.2% for (b). For the more complex model (c) greater variation
is seen, but again the relative impact of the initial conditions are limited with 95% of the
parameter choices leading to changes between −12% and 11%. (Parameters are B = d =
0.0122 per year, δ = 3.5% per year, γ ∈ (0, 1) per day, R0 ∈ (1, 10), v ∈ (0, vc), T ∈ (1, 10)
years.)
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Highlights. The impact of current infection levels on the cost-benefit of vaccination 
 
• Cost-effectiveness of vaccine programmes before vs after implementation is 
considered 
• Simple analytical models and numerical solutions used to quantify differences 
• Benefits of maintaining vaccination at least equal to starting a programme. 
• Successfully immunising individuals  does  not  devalue  the  vaccination  program 
 
